Play as a Pathway of Behavior
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Seeking to understand play as part of a more general theory of human relationships, the author defines play as one of four fundamental categories of behavior, the others being work, ritual, and communitas. He discusses how each of these behaviors is organized as a "pathway" that offers distinctive opportunities for experiencing life and for discovering "self-locations," specifically privilege, subordination, engagement, and marginality. These pathways and self-locations are understood to be key elements in the formation of experience. Associating play, ritual, work, and communitas with either ascending (self-directed) meaning or descending (other-directed) meaning, he describes their related "emotion sequences," essentially chains of emotions that lead from feelings of anticipation to those addressing occurrences in the present to remembrances. For example, work leads from self-confidence to pride; play, from curiosity to gratitude; communitas, from hope to blessedness; and ritual, from faith to reverence. Each of the four pathways is a profoundly important, but also a limited format for action and experience. **Key words**: ascending and descending meaning; communitas; engagement; marginality; modes of self-location; patterns of behavior; play; privilege; ritual; subordination; work

THE STUDY OF PLAY has been marked by a philosophy of exceptionalism—the view that play is profoundly different from "real" or "ordinary" life or, indeed, from anything else that human beings do. To be sure, some of the great writings on play emphasize the extent to which play lies apart from daily routines (Huizinga 1955; Caillois 2001). Inside the magic circle of play, so some argue, players take liberties with the policies and practices of their societies. They set customary behaviors aside. Inside the circle, they can practice life, parody it, fantasize about it, and even resist it. And during these explorations, they understand that what happens on the playground gets judged only by the rules of the playground. Rid of life's usual consequences, play takes on the guise of speculation, mimicry, and make-believe. In all these ways, the classic texts consider play special.

In this article, I do not challenge the idea that play is a distinct way of relating to the world. But I do question the case some make for its specialness. I argue here that instead of contrasting play to all other activities, it is more useful to compare play to some other basic—and equally distinctive—patterns. These

patterns are work, ritual, and communitas. Each of them, I argue, is a pathway for experience, a publicly recognized trajectory that orients participants to what will occur and then carries them through that event. Once an activity has been identified in this fashion, everyone knows what behaviors are appropriate, what statuses or "standings" the participants are seeking, what objects and settings are pertinent, and how the whole affair—composed of recognized beginnings, middles, and ends—is going to be comprehended and discussed as an "event."

The postmodern philosopher Jacques Derrida (1981) has claimed that we cannot know the true essence, nature, or meaning of things. Precise under-standings elude us even as we seek dictionary definitions. However, all of us have a strong sense that one thing is not the same as another. That is, we look at the world's objects and occurrences—including the activities that I focus on here—by remarking on their contrast, their differences. We decide what things *are* by recognizing what they *are not*. We judge presence (all the things that are going on here and now) by absence (all the things that could be going on here and now but have been neglected, excluded, or purposely placed in the background). My approach to play, ritual, work, and communitas shares this character. All of us know that play is *somehow* different from work or from ritual and even from the general festivity and bonding I call communitas. We know that distinctive orientations and skills are required of us in each of these activities. And we sense that different patterns of achievement—and feelings of emotional satisfaction—make up the goals connected to them.

My theme here follows the thinking of sociologist Erving Goffman, par-ticularly in his classic work, *Frame Analysis* (1974). Goffman, who was himself influenced by the theories of psychologist William James (1952), wished to understand how people determine that something is real, or at least real enough for them to take seriously and to adjust their behavior accordingly. Goffman claims that every inquiry begins with the question: "What is it that's going on here?" (1974, 8). His *Frame Analysis* attempts to describe many of the ways in which people define "situations" by offering accounts that name occurrences and then specify rules, roles, and relationships pertinent to these situations. Follow-ing the lead of anthropologist Gregory Bateson (1972), Goffman explains that people make very subtle distinctions between kinds of behaviors (and between the various situations in which the behaviors occur). Thus, something that looks like a fight with possibly deadly consequences may in fact be a form of sport or play—a dramatic performance, a practice, a test, a prank, even a distraction. More extremely, the fight we witness may be a dream, a daydream, or a hallu-

cination. To use Bateson's famous phrase, a bite is not a "bite" when it's a "nip." Understanding an event, Goffman argues, proves especially important at the beginning when its interaction is filled with ambiguous meanings and when some of its participants are attempting to manipulate or confuse others.

In *Selves, Societies, and Emotions: Understanding the Pathways of Experience* (Henricks, 2012), I extend Goffman's thesis in *Frame Analysis* into a more general theory of human experience. I argue that people not only "frame" patterns of interaction by placing them into publicly recognized categories, they also, in much the same way, identify the people involved, the behaviors of these participants, the settings in which the "activities" occur, and even the emotions appropriate to those in such situations. In other words, people tend to see particular activities as instances of general models or "types," and these models serve as guidelines for their judgments and behaviors during such activities.

This article's particular theme explores the behavioral pathways of play, work, ritual, and communitas. In addition to arguing that these behavioral pathways are recognized trajectories that people follow, I show how the four frames offer models for reaching identifiable positions or standings in the world. I conceive of these standings as essentially patterns of self-location—privilege, subordination, marginality, and engagement. The first part of this article describes these four standings and suggests that each offers distinct opportunities for experience, some of them satisfying, some of them not. The second part of this article describes the specific pathways for reaching each of these standings and details some of the emotions involved. Concluding comments discuss some limitations of each pathway as a form for human experience. Essentially, the article seeks to understand play (and the three other pathways) as part of a more general theory of human relationships.

Interaction as a Process of Self-Location

In *Selves, Societies and Emotions*, I emphasize the theme that people are orderly creatures who wish to "know" the character of situations so that they can move through them in an efficient, confident, and morally justified way. However, people are also restless creatures who want what they do not have and, indeed, who frequently become dissatisfied with the objects they have secured and relationships they have established. Said differently, all of us want stimulation as well as security, movement and change as well as stability. Nurturing this restless,

inquisitive spirit—understood as the wish for challenging relationships with the elements of the world—provides a guiding theme of play studies.

Much less clearly have students of play recognized other ways in which this restless spirit finds expression. To be sure, people want to test, tease, and even "toy" with external occurrences. Transformative processes come in different types. And, like play, ritual, work, and communitas can also be attempts to change the world—or to be changed by it.

Human interactions involve a process of seeking and inhabiting self-locations with regard to the objects of the world, especially social relationships, that is, an individual's engagement with other individuals and with groups. And, all of us establish relationships with objects, elements, and occurrences. In play, for example, participants use this seeking process to establish relationships with the objects of their material environment (such as blocks and balls), with elements of their culture (publicly circulated songs, stories, and customs), with their bodies (centering on the forms and functions of their physicality), and even with their psychological make-up (focusing on their subjectively held beliefs, dispositions, and visions of self). In fact, human experience is the awareness that one is involved in "relationships" with such elements, and this involvement usually includes a judgment about one's "standing" in these relationships.

If people use these interactions or relationships to acquire what they do not have, they produce a society in which relationships are in continual tension and subject to change. Only sometimes do we achieve our ambitions. Sometimes, we fall short. Sometimes, we find ourselves trapped in behaviors, statuses, and personal identities we wish we could avoid. Some of these locations are of long-standing (such as our ethnic and gender identities or our membership in our birth families). Other locations (such as being the front-runner in a race or the recipient of a compliment) are extremely transitory. In any case, I call what people seek and experience "standings," a sense of social predicament that contrasts the position of one person to another. Seen this way, social life features not only endless interactions between individuals but also endless invidious comparisons. What we have and are we have and are compared to what others have and are. And these presumed qualities and acquisitions are put to the test when we interact.

If we view interactions as attempts by subjects and objects (or to use sociological language, by selves and others) to impose their strategies of actions and interpretations on one another, we might show self-location as four different patterns. These standings appear in figure 1.

Figure 1. Four modes of self-location

I argue, then, that there are four principal patterns of self-location—privilege, subordination, engagement, and marginality. Two of these patterns— privilege and engagement—display conditions that I have discussed elsewhere as "ascending meaning" (Henricks 2006, 2010). That is, they describe circumstances in which the subject or self controls a relationship or otherwise claims the activity of the other in the subject's own terms. In more settled social conditions, these abilities tend to be recognized as rights. In less settled conditions, they are called powers.

Two of the four patterns—subordination and engagement—represent locations characterized by "descending meaning." In such circumstances, the subject accepts the directives of others and comprehends himself as an object in their terms. When people recognize their obligations to others as legitimate, we call such obligations responsibilities. In less settled conditions, we think of them as duties. The remaining pattern or condition—marginality—reflects situations where the interventions of both self and other are minimal.

My model displays human relationships as an interchange or dialectic between selves and others, essentially a balancing and alternation of claims. To better envision this dialectic, consider the relationship between self and other as a sort of handshake. The bond is strongest when the grips of both individuals hold firmly, and it is weaker when the handshake of each is soft or when they are withdrawing from it. However, a strong bond results when one party holds tightly against the weak or absent pressure of the other. In this last instance, I would say the person who holds tightly controls or claims the other.

All of us recognize well enough these experiences of controlling others and of being controlled by them. We also know the feeling of being embedded deeply in relationships of mutual control. And we notice when we are marginalized and, in a double sense, are "out of control." To experience the world is to comprehend one's predicament within a wide range of settings. Issues of power or status, as sociologist Theodore Kemper (1990; Kemper and Collins 1990) emphasizes, are inevitable portions of this awareness. As I will argue, our emotions reflect our sense of moving into, residing within, and moving out of these standings. But first, let me comment briefly on each of these patterns of self-location.

Privilege

No standing in contemporary Western societies is extolled as much as privilege. To be privileged is to possess special rights, immunities, and benefits. What makes these rights special is that other people do not possess them. In figure 1, privilege appears as an imbalance between rights and responsibilities, between claims and counterclaims. A privileged person can summon or beckon others, typically without fear of obligation or reprisal.

Sociologists understand privilege as an advantageous position with regard to the valued resources of society—specifically wealth, power, prestige, and knowledge. Although each of the resources differs some from the others, individuals who possess these social advantages share a sense that they can make their way through the world relatively unhindered and can use such resources to secure the compliance of others. They find themselves being carried along as if on one of those moving walkways in airports. With absolutely no effort, these mechanically assisted pedestrians either race past others in the walkway or simply ride along and keep pace as the outsiders scurry along. In both cases, the privileged find themselves advantaged in ways others are not.

Not uncommonly, positions of advantage carry with them their fair share of obligations. But many of the obligations of privileged people help position

those even more advantaged than they, and many others involve voluntary acts of charity and public service. In any case, being privileged means that one can set one's own agenda for relationships with others and, therefore, can interfere without being interfered with.

In class-based societies, this ideal represents economic prerogative. One acquires and spends money to enter a setting where the customer is customarily right, where the resource holder does not serve but is instead served. Like owners of publicly traded stocks—who possess no obligations to companies whose stock they own, nor to the clients of those companies, nor even to the broader communities in which those companies operate—we wish to separate rights from responsibilities. We distinguish the ideal life by the extent of its prerogatives, and belonging affords the fortunate an opportunity to control others. "Membership," to borrow a slogan of a credit card company, "has its privileges."

Subordination

Westerners devalue the opposite circumstance, in which orders are taken rather than given and in which people find their behavior constrained at every turn. In societies that prize independence, we evaluate conditions of subordination and restriction as something to be escaped. We judge, for example, the status of temporary underlings—as in the case of a child in a family or of a lower-level manager in a company who expects to be promoted one day—to be bad enough. We deem much worse, however, those forms of continuing subordination based on, say, gender, class, ethnicity, physical ability, and sexual orientation. Most of us wish to manage our own destinies. At the very least, we want to choose the standards that apply to our lives.

While Western religious traditions sometimes explore ideas of "servanthood," typically such a posture of humility occurs before a transcendent God and not before some more proximate, secular being. Georg Simmel explained subordination to an abstract principle as quite different from subordination to a person or to a group (1950). Moreover, the religious person commonly undertakes this subservient position voluntarily, often through public rituals featuring acts of self-abnegation, formal vows, offerings, and other displays of penitence and obedience (Durkheim 1965). Such pledges and commitments, when undertaken freely by adults, are understandable to the Western mind. However, a certain suspicion persists about what will happen to those earnest devotees of persons and organizations (monasteries, sects, military outfits, hospitals, gangs, radical political groups, and similar entities) that will henceforth manage their behavior.

I find that this emphasis on the involuntary and permanent aspects of sub-ordination blinds one to the importance of responsibility in human affairs. This was the abiding theme of Durkheim's sociology. Individuals need clear directions for how to proceed, including limits and boundaries for their movements. These boundaries may well be self-imposed, but they also may come from socially recognized others, especially those well-established groups and communities that articulate and encourage certain forms of human possibility. We should not take these directives lightly or playfully; rather, we should consider them with utmost seriousness. People must learn to understand themselves not just as "subjects" (who discover what they can do to the world) but also as "objects" (who find out what can be done to them). Society, in Durkheim's view, is "real"; and we need that transcendent, superordinate reality to display and coordinate our obligations to one another.

Marginality

I have discussed two quite different places to experience selfhood: privilege (where one learns the lessons of power and control) and subordination (where the teachings emphasize dependency and constraint). Marginality minimizes both forms of awareness. People are marginal when they are disconnected from others, or at least when they understand themselves to be. Such marginal indi-viduals are guided by neither ascending nor descending meaning.

However, independence of this type is not equivalent to complete isolation or disaffiliation. Once again, Simmel (1971) makes this clear in his essay on the stranger, the marginal person who is both connected and disconnected at the same time, "in the world" but not "of it." Pointedly, the marginal person con-tinues to involve herself in the situation or at least be oriented to it; that is why she is "on the margin" rather than apart. Those who call themselves outsiders have not turned away from the group entirely; they still look inside, sometimes with their noses pressed against the window. Rebels—both those who merely disavow the world and those who seek to re-create it—maintain their former object of reference. And thus, independent people understand their freedom in terms of the forces that once held them captive.

Social scientists customarily think of marginality as an unwanted or even mournful condition. We tend to present outsiders as people who wish to join a group that will not grant them full membership. Being in a minority com-monly means being both subordinated and kept at a distance at the same time. However, as the preceding paragraph suggests, *relative* separation can also be a

valued condition that allows one to judge a group critically and creatively and that provides its own distinctive spheres of operation. As Simmel explains in his essay, the marginal person does not merely pass through society (as a traveler does) but remains to live (in a partially accepted way) among its members. "Foreign" merchants, professionals, and civil servants of this sort may be invited to formal social occasions or consulted for their advice by more established group members. These foreigners are often invited in just because they have no firm basis from which to threaten or control the recipients of their advice.

I would attribute the ambiguous status of the marginal person to two different aspects of the idea of freedom. On the one hand, freedom means freedom from objects and persons, a disconnection from the usual obligations and interferences that others impose upon our thoughts and actions. This aspect of freedom—the absence of descending meaning—we celebrate routinely in Western societies. People imagine themselves free when they do not have to listen to their parents, pay taxes, receive telephone solicitations, or take the dog for a walk. But, freedom also means the freedom to accomplish ambitions and desires. Typically, meeting our goals depends on the cooperation and support of others; sometimes their acceptance of us is the very goal we seek. Without firm connections to others (as Durkheim emphasizes) we can accomplish only the most limited, self-oriented tasks. In this sense, marginality also features the absence of ascending meaning. Because we are positioned on the edge of a situation, we cannot turn that situation to our own purposes. We have all the freedom we want—to do and go as we desire. But we do not have the social resources to realize such ambitions.

Engagement
The final condition stands opposite to the separation I have just described. Engaged persons find themselves in the thick of interaction with the world. Such persons are frequently confronted by difficult external demands. However, they do not seek to evade these demands but instead confront and respond to them. Moreover, engaged people play active roles in situations, claiming others as vigorously as others claim them. Clearly, a relationship of this sort forms a pattern of give-and-take, an effulgence of both ascending and descending meaning. Images of busy homemakers, striving businesspeople, and actively playing children apply.

I use engagement (and the general appearance of figure 1) to remind readers of Csikszentmihalyi's (1975, 1991) depictions of focused involvement or

"flow." It is not a paradox to say that we find ourselves most effectively when we participate voluntarily in worthy, intricate challenges. In fact, we can know neither ourselves nor the world around us by regarding such objects from a distance.

Some readers may recall that Durkheim's sociology confronts similar issues of personal immersion or participative involvement. In his *Suicide*, Durkheim (1951) displays four potentially dangerous modes of human relationships. Two of these patterns concern the absence of descending meaning. Durkheim uses the terms *anomie* and *egoism* to denote patterns in which the individual becomes detached from social settings, a detachment facilitated by the failure of the settings to draw him in and hold him (anomie) or by the relatively asocial character of his guiding beliefs (egoism). Humans need involvement with others and beliefs that recognize these connections to live fully and well.

However, Durkheim also emphasizes the dangers of overinvolvement in situations that effectively extinguish the self. His criticisms of altruism (a commitment to a set of beliefs that disregards selfish interests) and fatalism (surrender to dominating groups or persons) recognize the importance of ascending meaning. People need the demands and guidance of others, but they also need opportunities to express themselves and to receive public acknowledgment for these expressions.

Like Csikszentmihalyi, Durkheim argues that the most productive human relationships feature a kind of reciprocity between the demands of the self and the demands of others. Assertion and compliance, rights and responsibilities, freedom and dependence need balance. That said, the question remains: How deeply involved should people be in their relationships with others? Is an extremely focused, even passionate embrace with the objects and contexts of our lives—whether those are other people, organizations, hobbies, pets, jobs, or social causes—the preferred path for self-development? Or does deep engagement present its own set of difficulties?

In answer, I would recall that marginality also serves as a balanced or reciprocal condition featuring limited claims from both parties in a relationship. Although marginality seems a rather disaffected and disengaged pattern of self-awareness, it provides, at its best, a certain distance that allows an individual to evaluate critically the object of her regard. In the case of play, this relative separation encourages imagination and exploration (Singer and Singer 1990; Sutton-Smith 1997). It also serves as the staging area for more interactive or "assertive" styles of play (Henricks 2010).

In contrast, full engagement frequently causes an individual to lose this

sense of perspective. Like Plato's (1963) famous residents of the cave or Dante's (2003) pilgrim lost in a dark wood, we can be so captured by the give-and-take of a confining environment that we cannot comprehend our own predicament. We feel ourselves moving about—and experiencing the distinctive joys and sorrows associated with these movements. But we have no vantage point from which to glimpse the character of our lives.

Feelings of Ascending and Descending Meaning

I have argued that each pattern of self-location opens up some avenues of experience and restricts others. More precisely, each pattern offers a distinctive range of satisfactions and dissatisfactions. But are the feelings associated with privilege, marginality, engagement, and subordination truly different from each other? My own understanding of satisfaction suggests that almost any condition can be declared satisfying as long it conforms to the optimal standards—physical and symbolic—of the interpreter. Is not satisfaction or pleasure of one type just the same as that of any other? I contend that the positive feelings associated with ascending meaning and with descending meaning are different.

Csikszentmihalyi (1991) offers one of the better-known attempts to explain the differences between positive feelings. Comparing pleasure and enjoyment, Csikszentmihalyi argues that the latter is a much more complicated—and more rewarding—experience than the former. Pleasure, as he sees it, equates with feelings of contentment or satisfaction. Pleasure is homeostatic, it restores equilibrium. Pleasure occurs, as he states, "when consciousness says that expectations set by biological programs or by social conditions have been met" (1991, 45). In other words, pleasure essentially closes one off from, rather than opens one up to, possibilities; it is an act of restoration instead of exploration. It is a self-indulgent feeling that requires "no psychic investment" (46) and produces no psychic growth, as when we take pleasure from eating and drinking.

But, enjoyment represents an awareness that goes beyond satisfaction, a kind of "forward movement" (46) in which the person experiencing it achieves "something unexpected." Enjoyment is an active experience requiring an unusual investment of energy. It is psychically more complex than pleasure, and it promotes personal growth. Compared to pleasure, enjoyment delivers a more full-fledged encounter with the world. Enjoyment causes us to change and does not necessarily satisfy us at the time of its making.

A listing of Csikszentmihalyi's "elements of enjoyment" explains the relationship of the experience to flow (1991). He asserts that enjoyment comprises a challenging activity that requires skills; a merging of activity and awareness, clear goals and feedback; a concentration on the task at hand; a paradox of control; a loss of self-consciousness; and a transformation of time. Furthermore, we understand enjoyment as an autotelic experience, one in which we create for ourselves a context that is intrinsically rewarding. When we enjoy ourselves, we focus on only the moment; we do not look about. The paradox of control he refers to is the sense that even though we are not in control, we feel as though we are.

Csikszentmihalyi claims that enjoyment is the mode of experience most appropriate to our best or optimal selves—when we energetically engage the world in focused and committed ways. Pleasure reflects our less heroic side, when we are merely filling our tanks, so to speak. To translate Csikszentmihalyi's conceptions into our terms, it seems that he takes the ideas of excitement (that is, the sense of resistance, novelty, and disorder), self-direction (the attempt to comprehend and control the world), and even other direction (the adjustment of the self to the world's forms and forces) and grants all of these to enjoyment. The latter experience is held aloft as the rightful satisfaction for those who dare to address the difficult challenges of life. Pleasure is merely its bloated, self-absorbed companion.

Csiksentmihalyi's view of enjoyment is well suited to his concept of flow and to the view of engagement I describe as a basic form of self-location. When people are in balanced or reciprocal relationships, they have to deal with many kinds of challenges. They make claims on others, others make claims on them, and the resulting dialectic is much more complicated than anything the participants would produce on their own terms. My interest involves describing the positive feelings that seem pertinent to three other patterns of self-location.

If enjoyment is the positive feeling associated with the reciprocal give-and-take of engagement, then pleasure (or at least the kind of pleasure that Csikmentmihalyi emphasizes) is connected to the more withdrawn posture I called marginality. At any rate, the kind of pleasure he depicts is of the solipsistic, self-regarding type. To find this type of pleasure, we flee from the challenges of otherness. Instead, we desire to live inside a well-defended psychological domain, informed by pleasing images and biochemical secretions. The pattern of comfortable isolation seems particularly pertinent to a postmodern "consumerist" self.

As profoundly important as this withdrawn posture may be—if only as an occasion to rest, recuperate, and speculate on new possibilities—my own

approach sees the concept of pleasure in a broader (and less pejorative) way. In my view, pleasure embraces both contentment and excitement. That is, people desire both security and stimulation, and pleasure is our evaluation that these concerns have been met. Moreover, I maintain that pleasure (as the more self-contained experience) and enjoyment (as its participative equivalent) can be achieved in different ways—through self-direction, through other-direction, and through combinations of these. In other words, I advocate a much more "activist" view of pleasure than Csikszentmihalyi does. In my view, people do not merely receive pleasure; they actively manipulate or respond to the world to achieve this condition.

Pleasure, to be sure, involves a critical psychological component, the internalized standards of mind and body. We are pleased when the world conforms to these terms. It is not surprising then that pleasure is so commonly associated with bodily movements, psychological fantasies, or other largely "private" indulgences. After all, if we wish to achieve ego mastery—and to discover ascending meaning by placing situations into our own frameworks—our bodies and minds are surely the regions we can most easily command.

In this context, one can contrast the isolationist, self-regarding style of pleasure related to marginality with the more activist style of pleasure seeking exhibited by the attempt to find positions of privilege. In the latter case, we desire that the world should dance to our own tune. In other words, we wish to do much more than watch what is going on: we want to use the world and, in the process, to experience our own powers of transformation. When we transform situations, the pleasure results in a kind of satisfaction that comes from successfully imposing one's will. Still, one can ask as the world dances: Is the tune being played at all challenging or enriching to its conductor?

Said differently, ego mastery lacking both the external conditions we find challenging and rewarding and the forms and forces of otherness is a fairly empty experience. So control is both a process in which we assert ourselves against the strong resistance of the world (and experience excitement) and a more stable condition in which we survey what has been done (and experience contentment). At some point, pleasure requires receptivity to otherness, a feeling that we are completed by the very forms we have taunted and challenged. So the runner, the lover, the dancer, and the musician find rewards in the body and mind they have pushed to the limits.

I argue that pleasure also comes from other-directed feeling. That is, pleasure is frequently an experience of descending meaning, the pattern that

features adjustment to external forms and forces. When we say we take pleasure in—or enjoy—musical performances, bicycling, or long summer nights, we assert that we find excitement or comfort in the sensations provided by these objects and events. To listen to a musical concert or watch a movie is to be confronted by the logics of these forms. When we enjoy something in this particular way, we allow ourselves to be manipulated by these forms and to savor the physical and mental responses the patterns produce within us. The pleasure we experience comes from our willingness to subordinate ourselves to the forms before us.

Real-life events usually feature mixes of such polarities—of excitement and satisfaction and self-direction and other-direction—or provide alternations from one extreme to the other. I have emphasized Csikszentmihalyi's analyses of flow and enjoyment here because I think they are important commentaries on events in which both ascending and descending meanings are going full throttle, where claims and counterclaims come as fast as selves and others can handle. In these cases, flow is almost "pure" interrelatedness. Selves and others wrap their arms around each other so intensely and intimately they cannot be separated. At such times, there is only the mutuality of endeavor; consciousness of self and other is forgotten. Still, I see engagement as only one setting for positive feelings. Marginality, subordination, and privilege also offer their own satisfactions.

Four Pathways of Behavior

Social relationships—indeed relationships of any type—are not fixed commitments. They feature activity, the movement of people through time and space. Conspicuous among these movements are people's ongoing attempts to establish and comprehend their standings before others. In the previous section, I analyzed four distinctive types of standings. Here, I discuss some fundamental patterns of activity that people follow to achieve these self-locations. The four pathways are work, ritual, play, and communitas. Figure 2 displays the relationship of the four pathways to one another—and to the four self-standings I have already described.

The first two forms—work and play—contain patterns of activity featuring ascending meaning. The last two forms—communitas and ritual—feature descending meaning. Just as the four standings can signify the balance of claims

Figure 2. Four pathways of expressive behavior

between selves and others, so the four pathways indicate the relative ability of people to impose their perspectives on the objects of their orientation. Work represents the pattern of interaction in which the self exhibits the clearest control over the environment; ritual is the path that features the self at its most yielding. Play and communitas lie between these two.

Work
Work is interaction dominated by the willful self. Typically, we understand work as a task, exercise, or some other form of manipulation. Although interaction with the object world may be challenging or interesting, the experience of the activity is neither the principal focus of work nor the central motivation for the worker. Instead, individuals use work to accomplish objectives that lie outside the boundaries of the event. For the most part, workers focus on products or ends.

Although we often associate work with economic behavior, the two match only if we stretch the definition of economics to include all the ways in which people alter the world to promote their own interests. Workers transform the objects of their orientation—objects that include social and cultural forms, their own bodies, the environment, and their own psychic states. These changes in otherness, particularly when the changes have implications beyond the event itself, represent the measures of work's success. With ambitions of this sort in mind, we climb stairs, fix a roof, wash and dry dishes, exercise, deliver a sales presentation, prepare a list of things to do, and complete similar tasks. The vision of an ultimate endpoint or goal establishes a logical pattern or progression for the activity, and participants gauge their progress as a series of somewhat predictable—or at least recognizable—steps forward. In all these ways, workers aspire to a standing of dominance or privilege with regard to the objects of their orientation. Like Karl Marx's (1999) idealized laborers, workers make something of the world and wish both to control their product and to benefit from its uses. None of this denies the fact that real-life examples of work feature all kinds of obligations and compromises that resemble the other types of relationships described earlier. However, the principal rationale for work suggests that people should reshape the world to suit their own interests.

Play

Like work, play promotes ascending meaning. Although play, as Jean Piaget (1962) emphasized, can be a selfish manipulation of the object world, it tends to be a more interactive and unpredictable activity than work. In other words, individuals play not as an act of control but as a testing or teasing of the environment. Players try to provoke reactions from the objects of their orientation. These reactions then require new responses from the players. When players hop across a room, make puns, wrestle, smear finger paint, tease one another, or make goofy facial expressions, they effectively challenge other people, their own bodies, and their environments to perform in certain ways. The fascination of play comes from our inability to predict just how the objects will react or what responses we ourselves will need to make to address their reactions.

Critically, the rationale for play differs from that for work. As work focuses on end products, so play focuses on processes. When we direct play to the attainment of some goal or end—as often occurs in the symbolically organized forms of play called games—the ending is important only (and meaningful only) within the context of the event itself. Players live inside the moment, and their

creations, like children's sand castles, have similarly brief lives. When players look outside the event for their motivations, play starts to acquire the qualities of work, or as Huizinga (1955) says, becomes serious in a utilitarian sense. As patterns of interaction, both work and play are contestive in that they oppose and seek to alter the character of otherness. But players glory in the unpredictable while workers prefer something more anticipated.

I would argue that even children know the frames of play and work well enough. They play, as adults do, in ways that respect the magic circle of the event, foster impish creativity within a format of shared rules, and honor the emotional satisfactions of those involved. Although everyone plays to see what can be done with the world, they also want to be surprised or excited by the consequences they wreak. They survey the changes they have produced—changes that include the willful resistance of the people they have provoked—and then begin again. As displayed in figure 2, players seek positions somewhere between privilege and engagement, between having one's way and having an intensive dialogue with the other.

Communitas

Like play, communitas as a pattern of interaction features adjustments from both the self and its world. Also like play, communitas as a pathway pursues engagement, the balancing of claims and counterclaims. However, as figure 2 indicates, communitas exists on the opposite side of the line of reciprocity. That is, in communitas, people tend to submit themselves to the forms and forces of otherness. Experience results largely from these external or other-directed formats.

The term communitas is surely unfamiliar, and perhaps, unwelcomed. However, I use it here because English has few words for participative immersion in social and cultural forms. The best-known description of communitas comes from anthropologist Victor Turner (1969), who wrote about how a group of initiates in a sacred ritual are sometimes cut off from the routine support systems of their society, cast into a common predicament, and subjected to the spell of intense feelings of brotherhood or sisterhood. Such feelings of shared commitment—and even transcendence—are also central to Durkheim's (1965) descriptions of collective effervescence and Randall Collins's (2004) natural rituals. Under the conditions of communitas, an individual feels part of some collective identity that informs—and frequently transforms—the self. For my part, I use the term in a much broader way to refer to participative immersion

not only in social forms but also in cultural, environmental, bodily, and even psychic forms (Henricks 2006).

Once again, I would argue that both adults and children know communitas well. We know what it means to go to a festival, parade, pageant, fair, picnic, theatrical performance, concert, or sporting event. We know that we will prob- ably be part of a socially united group gathered in a restricted locale and that the setting will, in large measure, determine the pleasures we experience. We also know, like an attendee at one of Simmel's (1971) sociable gatherings, that we must modulate our own interests to sustain the "sociability" that frames the event as a whole. Although we do not determine the character of the event to the extent we do in play, we accept this relative lack of control. Quite the oppo- site, we embrace the feel of the occasion—its sights, sounds, smells, and other sensations. To hear a wonderful musical performance or even to attend a great party is to be heartened by what other people can be and do. To be part of such occasions both satisfies and energizes us.

Like play, communitas is driven not by instrumental purposes but by the desire for satisfying experience. Aside from memories of the event, there is little carry-over into the wider world. Communitas and play both focus on consum- mation, the sense that experience is completed in the moments of its making. Like play, the event is unpredictable. As developed in Bakhtin's (1981) descrip- tions of carnival as a metaphor for modern life, we wander from one area of the fairgrounds, dance club, or party to another, not knowing quite what we will find. Communitas is not a scripted affair but a balancing act between the possibilities inherent to a form (such as a roller-coaster ride) and our own interest in wringing as much excitement or pleasure from the setting as we can (perhaps, by holding our arms in the air during the ride or yelling loudly). Although we assert ourselves in such ways, we know that external forms and forces largely determine the character of the moment. Compared to play, then, communitas is much more an acceptance of descending meaning. Play is the contestive experience of otherness; communitas is its integrative equivalent. At our own choosing, we dive into the pool, the meal, or the crowd and find our sensibilities altered by the experience.

Ritual

I have presented communitas and play as two pathways that move people toward engagement, although they do so from opposite directions. Ritual as a pathway leads most clearly to subordination. As noted previously, the concept of subor-

dination sits uneasily in the Western mind. How can anyone voluntarily accept a standing of inferiority or dependency or acknowledge gratefully the powers of otherness? Yet, subordination is precisely the goal of all ritual forms. In ritual, we surrender ourselves willingly to external direction.

Social scientists customarily think of ritual as a kind of public participation in symbolic order, a socially protected event in which people follow carefully prescribed lines of action. I use the term ritual in a much more general way to refer to immersions in both symbolic and physical forms. We fill our lives with little rituals, some socially recognized and others merely personal. Some of these activities follow rules that we can state plainly; we understand most of them better as habits, practices that we follow with only the dimmest understandings of their constituent elements and rationales. Most of us, I would guess, go through our morning (and evening) routines in a personally stylized way. We display characteristic patterns of expression and movement; we enter social arrangements with others that feature sharply demarcated rules and boundaries. All of us seek—and depend on—the orderliness of the world.

Still, ritual does not equal communitas: The latter focuses on the experience of immersion; the former, on its instrumental possibilities. People enter into and rely on rituals to transform themselves from one condition or situation to the next. We are sleepy in the mornings and need well-worn routines to get us ready for the day. We cannot find our way in life and require the fortification provided by religious exercise. We confront a stranger and depend on established frameworks to help us conduct our business. We do not enter these patterns for the sheer pleasure of their use, rather for their utility in carrying us through the activity toward ends we desire. In contrast to work, rituals do not aim to change the condition of the world but rather the condition of the participants. Ceremonies of birth, puberty, marriage, and other life-cycle events transform the self through carefully regulated immersion into publicly acknowledged forms. Rituals are not exercises in sociability but rather in solidarity, understood as the firmer stationing of people in established patterns of life.

To complete the comparison of the four types, rituals are the events most dominated by descending meaning. Like communitas, they are integrative, but they differ from communitas by the degree to which the activity involved is orderly and predictable. Rituals are well-worn paths leading to clearly anticipated outcomes. They are the vehicles that transport selves through time. Inside these conveyances, the passengers discover experiences not found in the other forms.

Emotion Sequences

When we set off on one of these pathways that organize behavior and experience, we anticipate that we will encounter certain kinds of conditions and we ready ourselves to respond to the conditions in specific ways. Children—and adults—know what it means when they hear "go out and play," " get to work," or "behave yourselves" in a ritualized setting, or even "relax and enjoy" a special moment. Clearly, much of life consists of a mixing of these. However, I follow Goffman in maintaining that people have a preference for recognizable interaction trajectories. Once we have determined the "kind" of situation we are in, we can move ahead with confidence and bring others along with us. Staying on the appropriate pathway also means that we will not be tramping about in the under-

	Feelings of anticipation	Feelings of the present		Feelings of remembrance
Ritual	Faith	Enchantment	Rapture	Reverence
Other-directed enjoyments (mystery)				
Communitas	Hope	Delight	Joy	Blessedness
Play	Curiosity	Fun	Exhilaration	Gratification
Self-directed enjoyments (mastery)				
Work	Self-confidence	Interest	Satisfaction	Pride
		(Feelings of exploration/ disorder)	(Feelings of restoration/ order)	

Figure 3. Four sequences of positive emotions

brush of irrelevant activity or otherwise spending energy in unproductive ways. Instead, we envision the beginnings, middles, and ends of our activity and think about the kinds of satisfactions that we encounter at each point of the journey.

I maintain that the four pathways feature different patterns of emotional possibility. These patterns of awareness are found at the beginnings of activity (as feelings of anticipation), at its middle or interactive stages (as feelings of the present), and at its end points (as feelings of remembrance). Taken together, the feelings associated with each pathway constitute what I call an "emotion sequence," that is, a relatively predictable pattern of awareness and feeling that reflects one's movement through the event.

In figure 3, various positive feelings appear across a series of time zones described as anticipation, the present, and remembrance. The left side of the figure displays a gradient between two opposite ways of constructing awareness, other-direction (corresponding to descending meaning) and self-direction (corresponding to ascending meaning). The four behavioral pathways and the four different emotion sequences associated with these pathways sits at points along this gradient. In other words, work, play, communitas, and ritual represent four relatively distinct (and publicly communicable) formats for personal experience.

Four feelings pertain to each of the pathways. Feelings about the future (anticipation) and the past (remembrance) are largely catastemic (or stability focused) in character and correspond to only one feeling for each of these forms of awareness. By contrast, feelings of the present are much more dynamic—reflecting the ebb and flow of events—and relate to two terms. The first of these refers to feelings of exploration, disorder, or movement (that is, kinetic feelings); the second relates to feelings of restoration, order, or stability (that is, catastemic feelings). Most generally, the model shows how people who move along the four identifiable pathways of events gauge their feelings at four emotional way stations. These stations are anticipatory feelings, feelings of change and movement, feelings of reaching more stable standings, and feelings of completion and remembrance.

Although few events unfold exactly as planned, two of the pathways—work and ritual—feature relatively straight-ahead movements. Their predictability stems from the fact that the activity is dominated by only one set of standards—either a set provided by the self or one provided by the other. The other pathways—play and communitas—feature frequently confusing or back-and-forth movements in the present, so that self-standings may be gained and then lost a moment later. With deference to all the complexities of real-life

events, I contend that the four pathways produce distinctive (and nameable) feelings that participants can anticipate, experience, and remember—and then communicate to others.

Essentially, the table presents emotion-sequences as an ideal type that provides an answer to the following question: What feelings would occur if the four pathways were enjoyable at every stage of their development? To be sure, only sometimes do events proceed as we wish. Failed experiences (sometimes caused by the high standards we bring to our lives) are commonplace: Teenagers find that their prom date does not live up to expectations; Worshippers cannot feel the guidance of the sacred at the times they need it most; A work project is ruined; Or a game proved boring rather than fun.

Arguably, the prospect of failure acts as a stimulus and sweetens any success that may occur. Said more precisely—and to rely on Erik Erikson's (1963) famous conception—people's emotional lives move along gradients between successful and failed resolutions of life issues. We understand (and cherish) feelings of trust—to take one of Erikson's examples—because we know mistrust: autonomy stands against shame; and initiative against guilt. So it is for the terms listed in figure 3. Interest pleases us because we can contrast the condition with disinterest. Blessedness seems special because it is shadowed by misfortune. When individuals move down one of the four pathways, they recognize both the emotional rewards and the emotional punishments they encounter along the way.

I make no claims that my sixteen terms for feelings are the very best choices for the patterns of awareness they represent. Words have many shades of meaning; and, in any case, the English language was not developed with the interests of chart makers in mind. For example, I use confidence and pride here primarily to describe feelings that recognize the powers and skills of the self. There are, I must acknowledge, other (more external) sources of confidence and pride. Individuals also take pride in what their family has accomplished, or they are confident because they have powerful relatives who can intercede on their behalf. Nevertheless, I claim that people understand the satisfactions inherent in the four behavioral trajectories in somewhat different ways.

The Work Sequence

The lowest—and most self-directed—sequence of the emotions aligns with the ambitions and satisfactions of mastery. Once again, work tends to feature patterns in which the subject has the situation in hand or at least believes that

it will follow a predictable course. Workers normally anticipate what events will transpire and thus approach those events with the expectancy of what appears here as confidence. Of course, workers can also lack confidence; but even in such a case, they presume they can control their environment and will be judged (by others and by themselves) on their ability to do so. In other words, workers operate within a narrative of self-control. They are expected to manipulate the objects of the world to suit their interests and to control themselves in so doing.

Because of the ego's dominance, the resulting experience does not tend to feature high levels of disorder and novelty. However, there are enough degrees of difficulty or resistance to maintain a level of excitement that is termed here interest (as opposed to disinterest). Successful completion of the event—which often centers on some technically oriented task—results in feelings of creative success or orderly restoration that appear in figure 3 as satisfaction. Surveying what has been done, the person may take pride in what they have accomplished. Such pride is ultimately an act of self-congratulation, a proclamation of competence.

The Play Sequence
The second type of emotion sequence—play—begins with a much less certain, more open-minded orientation that I call curiosity. Lieberman (1977) has described this orientation as playfulness, a creative, inquisitive disposition that encourages some children to turn almost any situation into something that stimulates and amuses them. Unlike Piaget (1962) who viewed play as a repetitious manipulation of objects that builds confidence in personal skills and understandings, most play scholars emphasize that players enter situations just because they are unsure of their abilities to control the elements they find in them. They know that they will be asked to control these elements—by testing, teasing, prodding, and deconstructing—but they are curious about what will happen when they assert themselves in such ways. Because individuals engage voluntarily, those who do not possess a curious disposition are unlikely to seek or enjoy play.

I describe the positive feelings associated with such engagement, once play has begun, as amusement or fun. This dialectical pattern, filled with moments of assertion and adjustment, reaches a culmination in exhilaration, the sense of being pleasurably spent or even laughed-out. Looking back, the individual is gratified, not just because he is pleased with his own efforts—though this is central to the experience—but also because he is pleased by the challenges provided by the others. Critically—and in contradistinction to the patterns

I discuss next—players make their own fun. That is, they impose their own desires on the world and, in effect, ask it to do their bidding. Players are gratified when otherness gives them a good game or otherwise meets their desires for appropriate challenge.

The Communitas Sequence

The third pathway—communitas—moves deeper into processes of other-direction or object dependency. In communitas, the relevant feeling of anticipation is hope, that form of wanting tainted by profound uncertainty. What an individual hopes for is a turn of events or a change in fortune. She has some understandings of the possible riches or blessings of the world—hence her cautious optimism—but she remains unsure whether the blessings will be bestowed and what she will feel if they do occur.

When blessings do happen, the appropriate sense of excitement is delight. Exploration is felt as enjoyable confusion; novelty prevails. But there is also a sense that order lies within—and even behind—the disorder. When the recognition of orderliness does come—as in the revelation of a mystery, witnessing a beautiful sunset, or some other perception of worldly coherence, the experience precipitates joy. Joy, in my view, transcends playful excitement or exhilaration. To know joy is to sense that there are spheres of otherness that can effectively engage and then expand the self. In remembrance, one feels fortunate or blessed to have been there—and to have participated—in the making of a revelation.

The Ritual Sequence

The final sequence—ritual—is the most other-directed of the four types. At the other extreme, work and play generate, for the most part, acts of invention. Individuals at work and play use their own skills to transform the objects of the world, and they take satisfaction in what they have created. These feelings of satisfaction might focus on the implications of the activity for the future (as in the case of work) or on the experience of the activity itself (as in play). In different ways, communitas and ritual occasion discovery. Like work and play, communitas and ritual are forms of encounter with the world; however, in these latter forms what is changed by those encounters is the self.   In communitas, people actively participate in the discovery process. They climb the tree of life and marvel at what they can pick from its branches. In ritual, people give themselves more completely to otherness and gratefully receive its lessons.

In the ritual sequence then, the appropriate mode of anticipation is faith.

To have faith is to banish the uncertainties of hope and curiosity and to replace them with a renewed form of confidence. This confidence arises from a firm belief, not in one's own creative powers (as in case of work) but in the powers of otherness. In rituals, one is pulled ahead by well-established, externally based patterns on which an individual can rely entirely. In the case of religious ritual, the faithful person believes that he can enter the halls of mystery, receive what he finds there, and then reenter the wider world as a transformed and more powerful being.

The excitement that accompanies the feeling of transformation I call enchantment. Feelings of novelty, change, and disorder may be prevalent, but these are less a sudden awareness of the curious qualities of the world (as in play or communitas) than a new awareness of self. In ritual, the individual feels changed into something else. I term the most exaggerated form of ritual completion ecstasy or even rapture. In all the other sequences, the individual feels her spirit rising. In this latter case, she has a sense of rising or even soaring upward. To know ecstasy is to feel transported into otherness. Looking backward at these moments, the individual feels a sense of awe or reverence, a profound respect and gratitude for having been changed in this way. Critically, people do not participate in rituals because they enjoy the experience; this sort of indulgent immersion has been described previously as communitas. Rather, they give themselves to these formations because they wish to move on to new stages of their lives.

Once again, my portraits of work, play, ritual, and communitas have focused only on the happy stations along these pathways. These pleasant feelings are simply the awareness that events are moving ahead in an idealized or optimal way. All four forms also present possibilities for failure and frustration. Furthermore, although I emphasize the ways in which people transform the world or are transformed by it, I should point out that the four pathways can also lead to forms of desecration. For example, work and play are often acts of demolition, a tearing down of things so that these things can (at least, some of the time) be reconstructed. Rituals, as both Durkheim and Goffman emphasize, resemble forms of denial or even mortification, formats that destroy current identities and social relationships. These negative rites, to recall Durkheim's (1965) term, usually precede the more positive rites that follow. Even communitas, that seemingly happy moment of festivity, bonding, and pleasant surprise, might connote a setting apart. Indeed, in Turner's (1969) formulation, people bond so intensely with one another precisely because they find themselves cut

off from their ordinary supports and statuses. The joy that comes from these newfound sources of support, like that of forbidden lovers who have pushed ahead against every objection of family and friends, arises in a context of loss and sorrow. By all this, I mean to say only that the positive feelings mentioned previously gain meaning by the specter of negative feelings. What makes them positive is the extent to which people have been able to align their actual experiences with their visions of what experience should be.

Conclusions

Ever ingenious individuals constantly take account of what kind of situation they face, what sorts of people they confront, and what versions of themselves they wish to present. They know what they hope to gain from their encounters and what standing positions they hope to attain. In fact, this is Goffman's abiding theme, which I have tried to develop in this article. People who build, teach, write, perform, conduct business, worship, give and receive medical care, and love one another all know that there are many ways of engaging otherness. To pursue these endeavors effectively, all of us seek frames that allow us to organize our ambitions, guide our movements within the event, and evaluate what we have done. We need this cultural or public support system to negotiate our relationships with others, but we also need it to make our own activity comprehensible to ourselves.

 I have developed the thesis that people seek and then occupy special standings that I term privilege, engagement, subordination, and marginality. These standings enhance the prospect of some emotions and discourage others. From these positions, people use the distinctive behaviors of work, play, communitas, and ritual to encounter and interact with otherness. Workers aspire to privilege over the objects of their work. Ritualists embrace subordination. People at play or in communitas become dialectically engaged in all the positions.

Each of these formats presents a specialized—and therefore partial—way of knowing the world. Societies that celebrate ascending meaning—represented by the formats of work and play—encourage their members to objectify and control the world. To celebrate the powers and integrity of the individuated self, as many Western societies do, is to extol only acts of manipulation. Creativity and invention are surely wonderful; and their counterpart—an elaborately constructed, defended, and possessive self of the sort that William James (1952)

depicted—can be a source of many satisfactions. However, such satisfactions are limited, and the ultimate consequence of all such inventiveness merely convinces the inventors of their own powers to control and recast otherness. The purpose of life, or so it seems, is to adore and decorate the self.

Ideally, work offers interest, satisfaction, and pride; it builds self-confidence. In the process, working people try to banish worries about their own incompetence, inferiority, guilt, and shame. On the other hand, play focuses directly on the experiences of self-induced success. Players want excitement, exhilaration, and fun. They want to look back and be pleased about their own role in the merrymaking. They wish to escape the possibility that they—rather than the world—can be depicted as being boring, dull, uncool, or otherwise inadequate. They want to engage the world, but they want to do this on their own terms.

Against the modern emphasis on ascending meaning, I highlight the pertinence of communitas and ritual as alternative pathways for personal experience and social well-being. Such paths teach lessons about the significance of responsibility, respect, and routine. They make plain the point that receptivity to otherness expands the self. They celebrate feelings of inclusion, trust, and social support. They counter the perception that people must always be in control of their personal destiny, that they must anticipate every contingency and even risk. They signal the importance of community and interdependence.

Though I have pointed to the value of descending meaning, I emphasize again that ritual and communitas possess their own limitations. Just as an independent, scheming self (the focal point of work—and to a modified degree—of play) effectively demystifies the world, so a thoroughly dependent self does service neither to the wider world nor to the person so oriented. Recalling Durkheim's arguments, forced and fraudulent descending meaning constitutes no model for human relationships. Communities must be understood as systems of social support for the thoughtful, creative persons who live within them. The older and less reflective styles of being—represented by Max Weber's (1964) affectual and traditional types of action—are inadequate to the challenges of living in an increasingly complicated world. Responsibility does not mean unthinking obedience; it means the ability to respond in considered ways to the external conditions of many types. The modern forms of collective life, however gigantic they become, require critical participation as well as reasoned support.

One can argue, as Aristotle argued, that the satisfying and productive life lies in a middle way between the extremes I have described. Instead, I look to the visions of Simmel and Goffman who find distinctive frameworks for human

participation, and each has its own logic and value. Both writers were well aware of the limitations of their own typologies and metaphors. Just as life cannot be reduced to the tinkering of an artisan's workshop or to the competitive ebullience of a football game, so it is not a festival, party, or religious ritual where one receives gratefully the bounties of otherness. The lessons learned in all such settings are important, but each is incomplete.

I do not reject the special insights of the social scientists whose work I have discussed. Rather I seek to reconsider and reorganize their views, and by that process, to remind readers of their continuing importance. When people act in the world, they find themselves in the presence of formations of many types. When we participate in these forms, we seek coherent locations (what I have called standings) and coherent routes (or pathways). These settings constitute the foundations of experience. But the participations-in-form raise necessary questions about which involvements are genuine and which are false, which are willing and which are forced, which address the needs of the participants and which do not. Wisdom in the social sciences—as in individual and public life more generally—depends on the difficult and sustained evaluation of such issues.

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